I develop a simple model to study how the interplay between the incentives of institutions and hackers alters cyber risk in equilibrium. The model shows that larger institutions are more likely to be targeted in economies wherein hackers’ payoffs are proportional to the size of their targets. The model also highlights how changes in cybersecurity technologies and competition among hackers can reshape the distribution of cyberattacks, leading to significant shifts in cyber risk.
Using a comprehensive transaction-level dataset, we show that the pricing of overnight treasury triparty repos is far from uniform across market participants and depends on a delicate interplay between three different factors: (1) the number of counterparties, (2) counterparty diversification, and (3) how actively such counterparties trade. Importantly, this interplay can be reshaped in times of stress.
WP
The Anatomy of Contagion and Macroprudential Policies
Carlos A. Ramírez
Reject and Resubmit | Management Science, Apr 2024
I propose a model to highlight the relevance of basic characteristics of the structural makeup of contagion for the design of macroprudential policies. Besides characterizing optimal policies under a variety of environments, I show that failing to incorporate said characteristics can lead to inappropriate strategies for crisis prevention.
2022
WP
Regulating Financial Networks: A Flying Blind Problem
I develop a model for studying the role that uncertainty about the susceptibility of a financial network to contagion plays in the behavior of its member institutions and the design of preemptive interventions. As uncertainty affects the perception of contagion risk, it can reshape market equilibrium inefficiencies, altering the scope of welfare-improving interventions. The socially optimal level of uncertainty depends on a delicate balance between the information technologies available to policymakers and structural features of the network.